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Abstract: This paper aims to present the application of a fishbone sequential diagram in air traffic
management (ATM) incident investigations performing as a key connection between safety occurrence
analysis methodology (SOAM) and accident/incident data reporting (ADREP) approaches. SOAM
analysis is focused on organizational cause detection; nevertheless, this detection of individual causes
from a complete incident scenario presents a complex analysis, and even more, the chronological
relationship between causes, which is lacking in SOAM, should be tracked for post-investigation
analysis. The conventional fishbone diagram is useful for failure cause classification; however, we
consider that this technique can also show its potential to establish temporal dependencies between
causes, which are categorized and registered with ADREP taxonomy for future database creation.
A loss of separation incident that occurred in the Edmonton area (Canada) is used as a case study to
illustrate this methodology as well as the whole analysis process.
Keywords: ATM incident analysis; fishbone sequential diagram; ADREP taxonomy; SOAM
1. Introduction
Air transportation systems are evolving towards multifaceted, hyper-dimensional, highly
distributed, and mutually dependent systems with levels of complexity not imaginable just a few
decades ago [1]. Maintaining extremely high levels of safety in this complex environment is more
challenging than it was in the past.
Stakeholders should gather, monitor, and study safety-related information to predict and
anticipate, not only actual, but also emerging safety risks. In this situation, safety analytics need
to improve to forecast future safety risks and safety performances. It is of paramount importance
that techniques and methods for identifying and predicting adverse safety events are engineered
and used broadly. Only then will it be possible to use safety events and occurrence information to
improve safety and to protect the air transportation system from any adverse impacts of increased
systemic complexity.
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1.1. Literature Overview of Aviation Safety Analysis
To keep up the pace, aviation is involved in a shift from reactive, traditional approaches towards
more proactive methods; that is, from compliance-based safety towards safety performance-based
methodologies [2,3]. This shift is sustained in a set of paradigms:
I. The evolution from Safety-I to Safety-II, descripted by Hollnagel [4], with Safety-III as a
combination of Safety-I and Safety-II concepts and approaches in consideration. Safety-I is
concerned with infrequent events that go wrong in a stable environment, and Safety-II is
concerned with the more frequent events that go right in a non-stable environment. Safety-I and
Safety-II differ in their ontology, but they represent two complementary views of safety.
II. New safety methods and models to learn from both previous approaches and stories of success
and failure, and to represent the complexity of modern socio-technical systems and the dynamics
of the interactions between humans, technical systems, and the environment. These methods
include epidemiological models [5–7]; systemic accident models, such as the system-theoretic
accident model and processes (STAMP) [8] and the functional resonance analysis method
(FRAM) [9]; agent-based models [10]; etc.
III. The reporting and evaluation of serious and less serious safety events. Relevant civil aviation
occurrences are reported, stored, exchanged, analyzed, and disseminated with the aim that
appropriate emergent safety events and risks can be identified, and safety actions can be taken.
The effective, proactive, and clever exploitation of this safety data is key to coping with safety
improvement in the complex upcoming air transportation system.
Despite the Hollnagel construction of Safety III as the integration of traditional safety methods
(Safety-I) and modern safety approaches (Safety-II), the three previous paradigms are still lacking
interconnection today. Classic safety methods, such as sequential models, are disregarded and
discarded in favor of more complex and recent approaches because of their limitations, missing
the potential of a multi-method perspective in the context of safety management. However, new safety
methods are complex and labor intensive and cannot be directly and straightforwardly applied to the
analysis of the data and information complied in aviation safety databases. Additionally, the potential
of aviation safety databases for detecting and predicting emergent safety events has not yet been fully
exploited. Despite a solid culture of notifying safety events and occurrences, aviation has not yet fully
succeeded in extracting the maximum amount of safety data from this information.
Statistics on serious and less serious incidents can provide a great amount of safety information.
Safety authorities, such as the FAA, EASA, ICAO, and EUROCONTROL [10], have invested a great
deal of effort in the identification of safety monitoring information and performance indicators.
Specifically, ICAO Annex 13 [11] requires that member states establish reporting systems for accidents
and incidents to gather information on real and potential safety shortcomings. European Regulation
(EU) No 376/2014 [12] makes mandatory the reporting, analysis, and follow-up of civil aviation
incidents. Moreover, the European Union has created a database, the European Co-ordination Center
for Accident and Incident Reporting System (ECCAIRS), with common standard collection and
exchange of aviation accidents and incidents. ECCAIRS implements the ICAO accident/incident
data reporting (ADREP) taxonomy for collecting, sharing, and analyzing safety information between
National and European transport entities. ECCAIRS complies with Regulations No. 996/2010 [13] and
No. 376/2014 [12] in terms of occurrence reports as well as safety recommendations. Regarding this
policy, the analyzed causes of all investigated incidents should be identified with their corresponding
ADREP taxonomies and recorded in a common database through ECCAIRS.
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Thanks to these dispositions, among others, today more safety data than ever are gathered;
however, only a small part of them is fully exploited, integrated, analyzed, processed, and used for the
best understanding of safety risks. New challenges have appeared to analyze the information available
in these big databases. The challenge is to take advantage of the volume of data, integrate data from
hundreds of sources, and extract knowledge from the test of the reports.
The adaptation of symmetry methods for safety signal detection might result in faster detection
of safety emergent issues in aviation. Symmetry analysis techniques are successfully applied today in
safety critical industries for safety signal detection from occurrence reporting databases. For example,
disproportionality analysis and sequence symmetry analysis are broadly accepted for safety signal
detection in healthcare databases [14]. Symmetry-based regression models have started to be employed
in road for safety analysis [15]. However, these types of methods and approaches have not yet been
applied in aviation to explore safety occurrence databases. Aviation, despite its high level of safety, is
lagging behind other industries regarding the application of advanced data science and data mining
methods to the early detection of safety signals.
Reports in the aviation occurrence databases need to be pre-processed to facilitate the safety
knowledge that can be derived from their contents. Unfortunately, systemic accident models, variability
methods, or agent-based models, although very powerful for understanding complex systems, cannot
be directly applied to the reports in the safety databases. In order to take maximum advantage of these
methods applied to such large databases, important pre-processing and pre-computational work need
to be done. Occurrences and events in the databases need to be systematized to extract relevant safety
information and to allow more complex methods to be applied on a common ground. Due to the low
level of detail of the information contained in the safety reports and the large amount of reports to be
analyzed in these databases (the European occurrence reporting system might receive around 900,000
reports per year), the methods to perform this analysis should be simple, powerful, cost effective, and
at the same time dependable.
For this task, modern methods might give way to older methods, such as sequential and
epistemological methods, that, despite being overcome by more complex approaches in their attempt
to explain how accidents happen in socio-technical complex systems, might still play a useful role
in the systematization of the preprocessing of occurrence databases. In particular, sequential and
epistemological models can be particularly tuned for this task when combined with other well-adopted
and -consolidated safety tools, such as aviation safety taxonomies.
In this work we proposed to reactivate the use of fishbone or Ishikawa diagrams, a sequential
method [16–18], in combination with the safety occurrence analysis methodology (SOAM), an adaptation
of the reason model (an epistemological method) by EUROCONTROL [19], and with the ADREP
taxonomy, the most complete aviation safety taxonomy developed by ICAO.
Sequential models have the potential to describe safety events as the consequence of a sequence of
events in a specific order. Due to the assumption of well-defined cause–effect relationships that facilitate
the propagation of the effects of events into an accident, they are not capable of properly explaining
complex accidents characterized by a large number of interactions between humans, technical systems,
and the dynamics of these interactions. However, this method can be very useful for classification of
the causes of failure and to establish temporal dependencies between causes.
The SOAM approach contributes to the identification of causes in an incident scenario [20]. This
approach is an exhaustive process for analysis of data collected during the investigation of a safety
occurrence and for providing recommendations. It was developed from the reason model, taking the
SHELL model as the basis for construction. It should be highlighted that the human involvement
consideration in SOAM includes analysis of the latent conditions within the organization. SOAM has
already been integrated by EUROCONTROL with other phases of investigation and widely applied
by all CAAs of EU members. The reason or Swiss chess model is widely applied for organizational
decision-making in safety-critical systems. Notably, the involvement of human factors in accidents are
investigated in-depth and documented; researchers like Neuhaus et al. [21] and Wahab et al. [22] have
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used this model for analyzing human behavior during critical incidents, even attempting to combine
it with a BN (Bayesian network) model for taking preventive measures. The detection of individual
causes from a complete incident scenario presents a complex analysis; furthermore, the chronological
relationship between causes should be tracked. However, the SOAM approach is unable to provide a
chronological relationship between causes, which we consider a relevant step for a post-investigation
analysis to understand their temporal dependencies. The fishbone diagram can improve this limitation
during incident analysis. Unlike most of the research works [23,24] where fishbone diagrams only
present static relationships between factors involved in the accident/incident scenarios, in this research,
the Ishikawa technique acts as a temporal axis connecting all causes detected with SOAM and codified
with the ADREP taxonomy to represent incident stages.
In the safety literature related to safety modeling, different comparison studies are cited, such as
Mogles [25] comparing STAMP and ABM (agent-based modeling) models for aviation incident analysis;
Underwood [26] using ATSB, AcciMap, and STAMP models for train derailment analysis; Smith [27]
applying FRAM, FTA (fault tree analysis), and BN for understanding industrial safety, etc. Based
on this literature review, limitations of sequential methods for the explanation of complex accidents
against more holistic approaches are presented in Table 1. Despite their differences, the three types
of models follow a common logic that incorporates additional steps when moving from sequential
up to systemic, passing through epidemiological. Figure 1 compares the scope of the three methods
according to the level of coupling and how much they consider the socio-technical context. It also
summarizes the logic of the steps mentioned.
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Table 1. Strengths and weaknesses of safety methods.
Class Methods 1 Characteristics Examples of Models 2 Strengths Weaknesses
Sequential • Consider sequences or
series of events.
• Might add barriers to
prevent events evolving
into accidents.
• Might use conditions that
permit the event.
• Might consider logical
gates to combine events
into other events.
ECFA/C Fishbone, Deviation
Analysis, FTA, Domino
Accident, MORT, STEP RCA,
MES
• Mature and consolidated methods.
• Easy to understand Good for
communication and convince
management Narratives are
available for sequential models to
identify entities and relations.
• Might represents a causal network
of states and events leading up to
an incident or accident, but without
considering feedback loops
• They consider failures, incidental
factors, deviations from a norm,
unsafe acts, and to a certain extent,
the social environment.
• Socio-technical context is
not taken into account.
• Only clear and simpler
improvements can
be identified.
• Limitation on describing
multi-state
component behaviors.
Epidemiological • Considers not only events
but a layer of latent
conditions into the model.
• Events are explained as
consequences of
actors’ actions.
• Actors are conditioned by
their organizations
Accimap, 3CA, CREAM, AEB,
Reason Model, SOAM, SCT,
SCM, TEM, SOL, Tripod
• Take socio-technical context
into consideration.
• Focus on elements that cannot be
analyzed by sequential models such
as company culture, safety
procedures, legislation, etc.
• They require more time
and effort because of the
bigger investigation scope.
• They are more
complicated because of the
difficulties of capturing the
context in a
comprehensive narrative
• As they are focus on
organizational and
managerial shortcomings
are sometimes perceived
as treating by managers.
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Table 1. Cont.
Class Methods 1 Characteristics Examples of Models 2 Strengths Weaknesses
Systemic • Aimed to capture the
strong hidden links and
influences between the
components of the system
• Each method has its own
ontologies and paradigm
to model the environment
• STAMP is a
system-theoretical control
cycle model that integrates
sensors, control,
controllers, actuators, and
conceptual models to
control the process.
• FRAM model the system
and its context in terms of
functions, function
characteristics (input,
resources it needs, outputs,
controls and real-time
behavior), and interactions
between the functions.
Outputs of the functions
are explained by stochastic
resonance leading to
undesired effects.
FRAM, STAMP • They acknowledge the tight
coupling of individual functions
and constituents of the system.
• Disparate descriptions of
these methods
• Small correspondence
between different
methods, such as FRAM
and STAMP.
• Difficult to create an
overarching narrative for
the accidents, then
moderate reliability.
• Difficult to apply and
longer application time.
• Extra effort might not be
justified in many cases by
the benefits of analysis,
particularly when the
consequences of incidents
are relatively minor.
• Less effective
graphical communication.
1 Method is defined as a series of steps to get to an outcome or a result. 2 Model is defined as a conceptual structure used to model an incident/accident.
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1.2. Proposed Approach
In this paper, we acknowledge limitations as well as strengths of the different types of methods
and propose a different application for the more conventional sequential methods in a pre-processing
phase, in combination with epistemological methods, such as SOAM, and the most complete and
up-to-date aviation safety taxonomy: ADREP.
This work proposed to reactivate the use of a sequential method, the fishbone or Ishikawa
diagrams, in combination with an epistemological method, the safety occurrence analysis methodology
(SOAM) which is an adaptation of the reason model by EUROCONTROL, and with the most complete
aviation safety taxonomy developed by ICAO, ADREP taxonomy.
This approach allows a new interaction among traditional and new safety methods. A triplet of
more conventional and somehow simpler safety methods and tools are used to pre-process information
in safety occurrences, paving the way for the further exploitation of safety occurrence databases with
much more complex, rich, and powerful methods, such as symmetry analysis or systemic methods.
Additionally, the outcome of this preliminary step will facilitate the link between modern methods,
such as the FRAM and STAMP, which could be easily applied in the air traffic management context
linked with the ADREP taxonomy and SOAM methodology. A loss of separation incident that
occurred in the Edmonton area is used as case study to illustrate this methodology, as well as the
whole analysis process.
2. Methodology
Figure 2 presents the proposed methodology with the main process that prepares every incident
investigation, from reporting to mathematical analysis.
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Figure 2. Proposed methodology.
As a starting point, the principal causes that lead to air traffic management (ATM) incidents have
to be investigated. Then, an analysis of the notified occurrences and investigation reports should be
required in a first phase. During this phase, factual data of each incident is collected, applying the
SOAM approach. However, a chronological vision of incident scenarios is not reflected in this data
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collection. The sequence of incident scenarios is considered as an important path to understanding
how incidents develop from a safe condition to a dangerous situation, and what relationships can be
established between the causes based on their temporal evolution; therefore, a sequential analysis with
identified factual data should be necessary in a second phase.
In the last phase of this analysis process, regarding ADREP taxonomy, all factual data can be
classified as events or factors, which are stored as mathematical parameters in an incident database for
further analysis.
2.1. Incident Investigation Report or Occurrence Notification Analysis
Regarding Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 [12], all interested parties implicated in aviation safety,
e.g., pilots, air traffic management (ATM)/air navigation service (ANS) staff, and manufacturers, are
responsible for reporting occurrences to the competent authorities and, through this medium, make
civil aviation safety achieve a high general level in the EU. At a global level, ICAO Annex 13 [11]
requires contracting states to establish systems for the reporting of accidents and incidents, and to
detect the causes and recommend improvements for real or potential shortcomings; furthermore,
according to ICAO Annex 11 [28], it is the responsibility of the contracting states to investigate all
air traffic incidents that take place in their airspaces. Once the investigations are concluded, every
corresponding state investigation office has the responsibility to publish investigation reports as results.
In this first step of this analysis process, ATM incident investigation reports are considered as input and
the SOAM approach is used to locate the direct links between the conditions of the occurrence and the
actions of the people involved [20], thus gathering factual data thereof. Based on the SOAM approach,
in this second step, factual data for collection can be classified in four categories: “Barrier Absent or
Failed”, “Human contribution”, “Contextual Circumstance”, and “Organizational Influence”.
2.2. Incident Investigation Sequential Analysis
As References [19] and [20] noted, the SOAM approach was developed based on the reason
model [29]. Therefore, its factual data collection method loses in this processing the sequence of the
incident or accident scenarios, the temporal relationship between data, and a chronological vision
of the incident or accident. For reasons of keeping the traceability and the sequence, one sequential
diagram should be used to analyze and organize the temporal dependency relationship between
classified factual data (step 3).
In industrial sectors, a fishbone or Ishikawa diagram is commonly used as a tool for accident
investigation analysis. Chang and Lin [30] illustrated how one fishbone diagram was developed
to identify the principal causes of tank accidents and another was developed for their prevention.
Meanwhile, researchers like Kunadharaju et al. [31] only applied this diagram for identifying the
principal components of fatalities during a work process. Nevertheless, the usefulness of this diagram
can be extended toward dynamic analysis in order to reconstruct incident scenarios. Thus, all factual
data within these four categories of the SOAM approach can be reorganized and linked with a
temporal line.
2.3. Incident Investigation Database Creation
As well as factual data gathering, factual data storing presents the same importance for future
incident or accident investigations. Two rules are followed in this phase of the methodology:
• Encodability: Each datum can be encoded with a reference number and a standard description.
• Uniqueness: Each datum only represents one event or factor. If a combination of more than one
factor or event is detected for a factual datum, this data should be separated in individual ones to
identify their factors or events.
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Events and factors are identified by applying a set of questions proposed by Ferrante et al. [32].
According to the conclusion of these researchers, an occurrence can be broken down using ADREP
taxonomy into a sequence of events, and the same events are composed of descriptive factors and
explanatory factors (step 4). This relationship between events and factors is represented in Figure 3.
In the first level, the answer to the question “What?” corresponds to an event; in the second level, the
answer to the question “How?” corresponds to descriptive factors (DFs), which identify the symptoms
of each event; and in the last level, the question “Why?” corresponds to explanatory factors (EFs),
which reflect the causes of the occurrence. The ICAO ADREP taxonomy [33] provides codification to
these answers with reference numbers and standard descriptions (step 5). This information conversion
aims to store all data extracted from incident investigations in a database tool, like Microsoft Access
SQL, for further information management (step 6).
Additionally, following the process performed in Reference [32], for each event and factor, we
considered the opinions of three experts, and the comparison study proceeded to determine the
taxonomy with more accuracy.
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3. Case Study: Loss of Separation (LOS) Incident in Edmonton, Canada
To illustrate the application of this methodology, one case study related to a loss of separation
incident was chosen for analysis. This case occurred on 27 June 2002 near Edmonton (Canada) between
CPB888 and CNS213 aircraft, in which we applied our procedure of analysis together with ADREP
taxonomy usage. The case was investigated by the Canadian Government [34] and summarized
as follows.
3.1. Overview from Incident Investigation Report
The occurrence, a loss of separation, took place in the afternoon on the 27th of June, 2002. Two
airplanes were involved in the occurrence: A BA3112 operated by Corpac Canada Ltd., registered as
C-GKGM ith the call-sign CPB888; and an SA227DC operated by Alta Flights, registered as C-FDMR
with the call-sign CNS213. The CPB888 was flying from Edmonton to Calgary under instrument flight
rules (IFRs) in an en-route phase of the flight, while the CNS213 was IFR en-route from Calgary to
Edmonton. Due to bad weather conditions, both aircraft were diverted east of their original flight plan,
and encountered each other, on opposite headings and FL160. Final separation between the traffic was
200 vertical feet and 1.3 NM, quite below the minimum separation prescribed for that airspace.
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3.2. Incident Analysis with ADREP Taxonomy Encoding
The whole occurrence from development of the first failure made to the end of this incident can
be divided into four adverse events based on SOAM analysis and presented in a sequential diagram,
as illustrated in Figure 4. Each adverse event was supported by several influential causes that were
extracted from the incident report as follows:
1. Pilot of aircraft (A/C) CPB888 did not question an inadequate altitude.
a. Air traffic controllers in that sector were used to issuing altitudes inappropriate
for directions.
b. According to Canada Flight Supplement planning documentation, air traffic control (ATC)
may assign altitudes inappropriate for direction of flight at any point along preferred routes
between Edmonton and Calgary.
2. A/C CPB888 was instructed to fly at an inappropriate altitude for the direction of flight.
a. Controllers were used to vector aircraft operating at inappropriate altitudes.
3. Controller cleared A/C CNS213 to the same altitude that A/C CPB888 without adequately
scanning the radar for traffic and possible conflicts.
a. All the ATC team at the sector (planning and executive controller as well as supervisor)
were at the end of their shifts and they were possibly fatigued.
b. Traffic was high and complex at the moment of the operation in the sector.
c. Inadequate management of staff contributed to a high workload.
d. The bad weather added extra workload to the controller that had to negotiate
avoidance deviations.
e. The area control centre (ACC) was not equipped with a ground-based conflict alert system.
4. None of the controllers in the sector detected the conflict between the two aircraft.
a. Aircraft was not traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS)-equipped.
b. Conformance to altitude and strip marking standards was not regularly checked.
c. Canada flight supplement planning documentation allowed ATC to assign altitudes
inappropriate for direction of flight at any point along preferred routes between Edmonton
and Calgary.
d. ATC was suffering fatigue and high workload.
e. Traffic was high and complex due to weather avoidance deviations.
All adverse events detected in this case study have corresponding events in ADREP taxonomy;
such correspondence can be either one to one, or that one adverse event can be composed of different
events defined in ADREP taxonomy, e.g., the adverse event from SOAM “2. A/C CPB888 was allowed to
operate at an inappropriate altitude for the direction of flight” has been identified in one event of ADREP
taxonomy "Deviation from clearance—assigned flight level" with encoding “2020517”; meanwhile, the
adverse event “1. Pilot of A/C CPB888 did not question an inadequate altitude” is composed of two
events of ADREP taxonomy “Provision of flight information by the ANS related event” and “ANS clearance
to wrong altitude", with encoding “2020601” and “2020202”. Similar to all extracted influential causes
from the incident report applying SOAM, they present correspondences with defined DFs as well as
EFs in ADREP taxonomy. Based on the characteristics of the taxonomy that each taxon is independent
from the others, the independency of every event, DF, or EF can be demonstrated. Through this
simple sample, as a result, an incident report with SOAM analysis is transformed into mathematical
parameters with codification, as presented in Table 2. Then, the sequential diagram presented in
Figure 4 is transformed in Figure 5 with ADREP taxonomy encoding.
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Table 2. Edmonton incident events and factors identification with accident/incident data reporting (ADREP) taxonomy.
Adverse Event Identified in
Report
Event Influential Causes Identified in Report Descriptive Factor (DF) Explanatory Factor (EF)
Pilot of A/C CPB888 did not
question an inadequate altitude
t = t(1): Provision of flight
information by the ATS (Air Traffic
Service) related event. (2020601)
Bad practices of Pilots in receiving inadequate
altitude in this sector for flight direction.
Flight crew’s control of the A/C
altitude. (12240300)
Experience of route. (105010205)
t = t(2): ANS clearance to wrong
altitude. (2020202)
Air traffic controllers in that sector used to issue
altitudes inappropriate for directions.
According to Canada Flight Supplement planning
documentation, ATC may assign altitudes
inappropriate for direction of flight at any point
along preferred routes between Edmonton and
Calgary
ASM (Air Space Management)
conditional route type. (24030202)
A/C CPB888 was instructed to
fly at an inappropriate altitude
for the direction of flight.
t = t(3): Deviation from
clearance—assigned flight level.
(2020517)
Controllers used to vector aircraft operating at
inappropriate altitudes.
ATC provision of a minimum safe
FL (24010704)
ATS
incorrect/inappropriate/inadequate.
(201020100)
According to Canada Flight Supplement planning
documentation, ATC may assign altitudes
inappropriate for direction of flight at any point
along preferred routes between Edmonton and
Calgary
ASM conditional route type.
(24030202)
Controller cleared A/C CNS213
to the same altitude that
A/CCPB888 without
adequately scan radar for traffic
and possible conflicts.
t = t(4): Navigation track error.
(2170400)
All the ATC team at the sector (planning and
executive controller as well as supervisor) were at
the end of their shifts and they were possible
fatigued.
Traffic was high and complex at the moment of the
operation in the sector.
Inadequate management of staff contributed to a
high workload
The bad weather added extra workload to the
controller that had to negotiate avoidance
deviations.
The ACC was not equipped with ground-based
conflict alert system.
ATC monitoring of sector traffic
load. (27030000)
Fatigue-other (102030900)
ASM updated capacity of an
airspace. (24030300)
Work overload/task saturation.
(204010100)
ATC monitoring of sector traffic
load. (27030000)
High workload due to staff/skills
shortage. (204010200)
Thunderstorm. (52031600)
ATC provision of information
concerning en route weather
phenomena that may affect the
safety of A/C operations.
(24010507)
ATC provision of a STCA (Short
Term Conflict Alert) warning.
(24010604)
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Table 2. Cont.
Adverse Event Identified in
Report
Event Influential Causes Identified in Report Descriptive Factor (DF) Explanatory Factor (EF)
None of the controllers in the
sector detected the conflict
between the two aircraft.
t = t(5): ANS conflict detection and
resolution related event. (4010400)
Aircraft was not TCAS equipped.
Conformance to altitude and strip marking
standards was not regularly checked.
Canada Flight Supplement planning
documentation allowed ATC to assign altitudes
inappropriate for direction of flight at any point
along preferred routes between Edmonton and
Calgary.
ATC was suffering fatigue and high workload.
Traffic was high and complex due to weather
avoidance deviations.
Traffic alert and collision avoidance
system/Airborne collision
avoidance system (11344500)
ATM of flight progress strip.
(21040102)
The interface between humans in
relation to use of flight progress
strips to communicate information.
(501020200)
ASM conditional route type.
(24030202)
ATC monitoring of sector traffic
load. (27030000)
Fatigue-other (102030900)
ASM updated capacity of an
airspace. (24030300)
Work overload/task saturation.
(204010100)
ATC monitoring of sector traffic
load. (27030000)
High workload due to staff/skills
shortage. (204010200)
Thunderstorm. (52031600)
ATC provision of information
concerning en route weather
phenomena that may affect the
safety of A/C operations.
(24010507)
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4. Discussion
This case study presents a loss of separation incident analysis using SOAM and ADREP
taxonomies, as well as using a simple fishbone diagram for the incident scenario reconstruction
keeping its sequential stages.
The SOAM analysis had led to the separation of an incident narrative report into four adverse
events and a set of influential causes. Adverse events described the incident in terms of “what has
happened”. A second layer of analyses allowed to decompose influential causes into descriptive
factors that explained “how the events took place” and explanatory factors that explained “why the
events happened”. The Ishikawa analysis captured the sequential relationship between these elements.
Combination of both methods allows a multidimensional dynamic description of safety
occurrences. Every safety incident can be dissected into four dimensions: (1) Time; (2) why (explanatory
factors) (3) how (descriptive factors) and (4) what (events). The four dimensions are excellent inputs
for more complex safety methods such as FRAM or SATMP.
For example, in FRAM, the following six elements are defined for each FRAM function or hexagon.
Time, a variable that takes into account temporal aspects. Output, the variable performs as results of
the FRAM function. Input, which makes the FRAM function active; and three additional functions
that regulates the outcome of the RAM function, i.e., preconditions, controls, and resources. There
is a direct correspondence between the dimensions of our approach and the variables in the FRAM
model. Time is presented in both approaches; events correspond to the output of the FRAM function;
explanatory factors are related to the inputs; meanwhile, descriptive factors can be identified as the
preconditions, controls, and resources.
Additionally, the analyses applied in this paper synthesized information embedded in safety
occurrences into a taxonomy. It facilitates the application of statistical methods to obtain safety insight
by applying modern data processing technologies. Forward analytic analysis, such as information
theory or decision-making analysis like a Bayesian network, can be applied to understand the
correlation between events and factors, as well as their contributions in serious incident scenarios.
Figure 6 presents a simple BN construction for the Edmonton incident. In this graphic model, the
scenario can be identified as two sub-phases based on time:
• Preliminary conditions from time (1) to time (3). In this sub-phase, few adverse factors are
presented in events and their multiple dependencies with events are limited. Then, the complexity
of this sub-phase is reduced, and the unsafe situation is not critical.
• Critical conditions from time (4) to time (5). This sub-phase presents a complex interaction
between factors and events. Notably, the absence of previous barriers to prevent the disclosure of
these factors leads this unsafe situation from not critical to critical LOS in the order of seconds.
In general, SOAM analysis is focused on organizational cause identification, then through this
method investigators have a clear and complete view of an incident scenario. However, analysis with
this method results in loss of the sequential relationship between identified causes, and the incident
scenario might be difficult to reconstruct. For this reason, ADREP taxonomy and a fishbone diagram
contribute an additional value in order to keep the relationship between events chronologically,
facilitate the incident scenario reconstruction, and provide an in-depth diagnostic of the impact of the
order in which events occurred in loss of separation incidents. It should be noted that the connection
between events or factors defined in ADREP taxonomy and causes detected during SOAM analysis do
not always present a correspondence. As observed in this case study, one detected cause in SOAM
analysis can be identified with more than one event in ADREP taxonomy.
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5. Conclusions
This work proposes to reactivate the use of fishbone or Ishikawa diagrams, a sequential method,
in combination with the safety occurrence analysis methodology (SOAM), an adaptation of the reason
model (an epistemological method) by EUROCONTROL [19], and with the ADREP taxonomy, the most
complete aviation safety taxonomy developed by ICAO. A loss of separation incident that occurred in
the Edmonton area (Canada) is used as a case study to illustrate this methodology as well as the whole
analysis process.
This proposal builds upon what can be considered three main paradigm shifts in aviation safety:
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• The consideration of safety III, defined by Hollnagel [4], as complementary combination between
safety-I and safety-II concepts and approaches.
• New safety methods and models to learn from both success and failed safety stories, and to
represent the complexity of modern socio-technical systems and the dynamics of the interactions
between humans, technical systems, and the environment.
• The reporting and evaluation of serious and less serious safety events.
The proposed work is an initial step to mitigate the remaining lack of interconnection between
the three elements above today. Despite Hollnagel’s proposal of integration of traditional safety
methods (Safety I) and modern safety approaches (Safety II), nowadays the three previous paradigms
present weak interconnections. Classic safety methods are overlooked and rejected in favor of more
multifaceted and fresh approaches, wasting the benefits of a multi-method perspective in the context of
safety management. Meanwhile, the new safety methods are intricate, demand high levels of expertise,
and cannot be straightforwardly applied to the analysis of the data and information complied in
aviation safety databases.
The paper extensively discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the various types of safety
investigation methods, in particular the ones that are proposed to be combined (fishbone, a sequential
method, and SOAM, an adaptation of the reason epidemiological method). It also places our proposal
in relation to other existing approaches, showing the benefits of a multi-method approach for safety.
This research is also contextualized as an instrument necessary for the application of symmetry analysis
methods into aviation safety.
Our approach will allow a new interaction between traditional and new safety methods.
The proposed triplet can be used to pre-process information in safety occurrences, paving the way for
the further exploitation of safety occurrence databases with much more state-of-the-art methods such
as FRAM or STAMP.
Through this methodology, we have also explored its advantage for possible computational
applications in incident investigations. For this case study, a simple BN model was created to
understand this specific incident scenario.
6. Future Work
This transformation from SOAM analysis to ADREP taxonomy codification allows the creation
of a database to store all events and factors of every incident. With the database, numerous research
topics related to ATM incident investigations, such as mathematical modeling, predictive analysis, or
system improvement assessment can be developed.
As a consequence of this methodology application, we have proceeded to analyze all serious LOS
incidents that occurred and were reported over four years within Spanish air space. Based on this
previous BN model analysis, we divided this project into two blocks:
• In the first phase, a static BN model was constructed to understand correlations between factors
and events in these serious incidents. Additionally, a computational analysis was considered that
combined the BN model with information theory for accident precursor detection [35].
• In the second phase, and for future work, a dynamic BN model should be considered to assess
the efficiency of current barriers or the possibility of new designs.
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Abbreviations
3CA Control Change Cause Analysis
A/C Aircraft
ABM Agent-Based Modelling
ACC Area Control Centre
ADREP Accident/Incident Data Reporting
AEB Accident Evolution and Barrier Analysis
ANS Air Navigation Service
ASM Air Space Management
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Service
ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau
BN Bayesian Network
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CREAM Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method
DF Descriptive Factor
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
ECCAIRS European Co-ordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting System
ECFA/C Event and Conditional Factors Analysis/Charting
EF Explanatory Factor
EU European Union
FAA Federation Aviation Administration
FRAM Functional Resonance Analysis Method
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
LOS Loss of Separation
MES Multilinear Events Sequencing
RCA Root Cause Analysis
SCM Swiss Chess Method
SCT Safety Climate Tool
SHELL Software, Hardware, Environment and Lifeware to Lifeware
SOAM Safety Occurrence Analysis Methodology
SOL Safety through Organizational Learning
STAMP System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes
STCA Short Term Conflict Alert
TCAS Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System
TEM Threat and Error Management
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